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Abstract—The secrecy capacity of a discrete memoryless Gaus-
sian Wire-Tap Channel when the input is from a finite complex
constellation is studied. It is shown that the secrecy capacity
curves of a finite constellation plotted against the SNR, for a
fixed noise variance of the eavesdropper’s channel has a global
maximum at an internal point. This is in contrast to what is
known in the case of Gaussian codebook input where the secrecy
capacity curve is a bounded, monotonically increasing function of
SNR. Secrecy capacity curves for some well known constellations
like BPSK, 4-QAM, 16-QAM and 8-PSK are plotted and the
SNR at which the maximum occurs is found through simulation.
It is conjectured that the secrecy capacity curves for finite
constellations have a single maximum.
I. INTRODUCTION
Security is one of the most important issues in communi-
cation, and more so in wireless communications where the
inherent broadcast nature of the wireless medium makes the
data more susceptible to eavesdropping. The conventional
techniques to secure data from wire-tappers are based on cryp-
tographic techniques, where legitimate parties share a secret
key. Shannon, in [1], analyzed such a system and showed that
to achieve perfect secrecy the conditional probability of the
encrypted data given a message must be independent of the
actual transmitted message. In [2], Wyner applied this concept
to the discrete memoryless channel with a wire-tapper where
the wire-tapper’s signal is a degraded version of the legitimate
receiver’s signal. His measure of secrecy is the normalized
equivocation rate, denoted by δ, as seen by the wire-tapper.
The rate-equivocation pairs (R, δ) (R is the rate of information
transmission to the legitimate receiver in bits/channel use)
were determined and the existence of positive secrecy rates,
Cs, for communication below which it is possible to limit
the rate of information leaked to the wire-tapper to arbitrarily
small values, was shown. In [3], authors specialized Wyner’s
results to Gaussian Wire-Tap Channel (WTC) and showed
that the secrecy capacity is the difference in the Gaussian
capacities of the main channel and the eavesdropper’s channel.
Generalizations to the WTC were studied by Csisa´r and Ko¨rner
in [5], in which the Broadcast Channel was assumed to be
more general (not necessarily degraded) and the sender wishes
to transmit common information to both the legitimate receiver
and the wire-tapper, in addition to the secret information to
the legitimate receiver. Several other related studies have been
reported on WTC/Broadcast Channel, Relay channel with
confidential messages, Interference channel with confidential
message, MIMO Gaussian wiretap channel etc [3]- [7].
Coding for WTCs has been studied by several authors.
In [8], Wei showed how to encode secret information using
cosets of certain linear block codes. In [9] Thangaraj et al.
and in [10] Liu et al., extended this idea and showed that
low-density parity-check codes (LDPC) can asymptotically
achieve the secrecy capacity of a erasure WTC and also
showed how this coding method can be extended to achieve
secrecy rates below the secrecy capacity for other channels. In
[11], Demijan Klinc constructed LDPC codes for the Gaussian
WTC. By transmitting the messages over the punctured bits, to
hide it from the eavesdropper, they showed that whenever the
eavesdropper’s SNR is below the SNR threshold of the main
channel (the gap which they call the ’security gap’) BER at
the eavesdropper increases to 0.5 within few iterations (BER
at the eavesdropper being their measure of secrecy). Recently,
construction of codes for the Gaussian WTC based on Lattices
have also been reported [12].
The secrecy capacity of a Gaussian WTC was derived in [3]
and was shown that the Gaussian codebook achieves capacity.
Though the secrecy capacity versus SNR (at the legitimate
receiver) plot gives us an idea of the achievable rates under
various noise conditions of the eavesdropper’s channel it fails
to tell us what happens when finite-input alphabet restrictions
are applied. The effect of finite complex constellation on
the capacity has already been studied for Gaussian Multiple
Access Channels [15], Gaussian Broadcast channels [14], and
Interference Channels [16]. In this paper, we study the effect
of finite-input alphabet on the secrecy capacity of a Gaussian
WTC.
The setting in this paper is a Gaussian WTC with the sender
using finite complex constellation and the elements are chosen
uniformly. Capacity calculations under the assumption that the
input elements are chosen uniformly from a finite complex
constellation is referred to as the Constellation Constrained
(CC) Capacity [13]. Throughout the paper, we refer to the
secrecy capacity of a Gaussian WTC, calculated under the
above assumptions, as Constellation Constrained Secrecy Ca-
pacity (CC-SC). Unquantized version of the received signal is
assumed throughout the paper.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
• Analytically we show that the CC-SC curves plotted
against the SNR of the main channel for a fixed noise
variance of the eavesdropper’s channel has a global
maximum unlike that with the Gaussian codebook input.
• We conjecture from the plots that the secrecy capacity
curves for finite constellations have a single maximum.
The SNR at which the maximum occurs and the rate at
this SNR are found through simulations for some well
known constellations like BPSK, 4-QAM, 16-QAM and
8-PSK.
This analysis, we hope, can be a guideline for practical code
designers intending to code for the Gaussian WTC, to decide
on the SNR at which to operate.
Notations: For a random variable X which takes values
from the set S, we assume some ordering of its elements and
use si to represent the i-th element of S. i.e. si represents a
value of the realization of the random variable X . Absolute
value of a complex number x is denoted by |x| and E[X ]
denotes the expectation of the random variable X . H(X)
denotes the entropy of a discrete random variable X and
h(X) denotes the differential entropy of a continuous
random variable X . For a complex random variable N ,
N ∼ CN (0, σ2) denotes that N has a circularly symmetric
complex normal distribution with mean 0 and variance σ2.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND SECRECY CAPACITY
CALCULATIONS FROM MUTUAL INFORMATION
The model of a Gaussian WTC is as shown in Fig 1.
The sender wishes to convey information to the legitimate
receiver in the presence of an eavesdropper. The goal of the
sender here is, not just to convey information reliably to the
legitimate receiver but also to perfectly secure the data from
the eavesdropper. Sender is equipped with a finite complex
constellation S ′ of size M with power constraint Po. When
the sender transmits symbol X˜ from S ′, the received symbols
Y˜ and Z˜ at the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper
respectively, are given by
Y˜ = X˜ + N˜1 (1)
Z˜ = X˜ + N˜2 (2)
where X˜ ∈ S ′, N˜1 ∼ CN (0, σ21), N˜2 ∼ CN (0, σ22).
By scaling the random variable X˜ by
(
1/
√
Po
)
, Y˜ and Z˜
by (1/σ1), the set of equations (1) and (2) can be equivalently
represented as,
Y =
√
SNR X +N1
Z =
√
SNR X +N2
where SNR =
(
Po/σ
2
1
)
, Y = (1/σ1) Y˜ , Z = (1/σ1) Z˜ , X ∈ S
(= normalized S ′), N1 ∼ CN (0, 1), N2 ∼ CN (0, σ2 ≡ σ
2
2
σ2
1
).
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Fig. 1. AWGN-WT Model
The secrecy capacity Cs for a general wire tap channel [5]
is given by
Cs = max
V→X→(Y,Z)
[I(V ;Y )− I(V ;Z)]
where the maximum is over all possible random variables
V in joint distribution with X , Y and Z such that V →
X → (Y, Z) is a Markov chain. The random variable V
does not have a direct physical meaning; it is used only for
the calculation purpose. Calculation of secrecy capacity for
a general discrete memoryless WTC is difficult and is still
unsolved. However, by imposing certain restrictions on the
characteristics of the main channel and the eavesdropper’s
channel, secrecy capacity can be calculated. In [5] it is shown
that whenever the main channel is ”less noisy” compared
to the eavesdropper’s channel [5], secrecy capacity is always
positive and the calculation of which simplifies to
Cs = max
PX (x)
[I(X ;Y )− I(X ;Z)]
where the maximum is over all possible distributions PX(x)
of X. We specialize our setting to the case of ”less noisy main
channel” by imposing the restriction of σ22 > σ21 . Also, for
the finite constellation setting since the distribution PX(x) of
X is assumed to be uniform [13], secrecy capacity calculation
further simplifies to just the difference in the mutual informa-
tions of the main and the eavesdropper’s channel. This secrecy
capacity, which we refer to as CC-SC is calculated as
Cccs = [I(X ;Y )− I(X ;Z)]. (3)
The mutual informations I(X ;Y ) and I(X ;Z) are calculated
as follows
I(X ;Y ) = h(Y )−h(Y |X), I(X ;Z) = h(Z)−h(Z|X). (4)
Since X is assumed to be uniformly distributed and N1 is
Gaussian distributed, p(y|x = xi), p(y) and h(Y |X) are given
by,
p(y|x = xi) = 1
pi
exp
(
−|y −
(√
SNR
)
xi|2
)
, (5)
h(Y |X) = 1
M
i=M−1∑
i=0
h(Y |X = xi)
= h(N1) = log2 pie, (6)
p(y) =
1
M
i=M−1∑
i=0
p(y|x = xi). (7)
Similarly, the expressions for p(z|x = xi), p(z) and h(Z|X)
are obtained as,
p(z|x = xi) = 1
piσ2
exp

−|z −
(√
SNR
)
xi|2
σ2

, (8)
h(Z|X) = 1
M
i=M−1∑
i=0
h(Z|X = xi)
= h(N2) = log2 pieσ
2, (9)
p(z) =
1
M
i=M−1∑
i=0
p(z|x = xi). (10)
Using (5), (6), (7), and (8), (9), (10), expressions for I(X ;Y )
and I(X ;Z) are found and are given in (12) and (13), at
the top of the next page. Taking the difference of these two
mutual informations we get an expression for the CC-SC Cccs
and is given in (14).
Theorem 1: The plot of CC-SC Cccs versus SNR of the
main channel for a fixed noise variance of the eavesdropper’s
channel has a Global maximum at an SNR <∞.
Proof:
It is easy to see from (14) that for SNR = 0, Cccs = 0.
Also note that both I(X ;Y ) and I(X ;Z) tends to log2M as
SNR tends to ∞. Therefore,
lim
SNR→∞
Cccs = lim
SNR→∞
[I(X ;Y )− I(X ;Z)]
= log2M − log2M = 0.
Now since Cccs is a bounded positive continuous function of
SNR we know from the maximum principle [17] that there
exists a point SNRmax less than ∞ on the SNR axis at
which Cccs attains a global maximum.
Thus, from Theorem 1, CC-SC function has a global maxi-
mum at a point less than∞. This is in contrast to what happens
when a Gaussian code book is used by the sender [3]. Let CGCs
represent the secrecy capacity for the Gaussian WTC which,
as shown in [3], is achieved by using Gaussian codebook at
the sender.
CGCs = log2
(
1 +
Po
σ21
)
− log2
(
1 +
Po
σ22
)
= log2
Po + σ
2
1
Po + σ22
+ log2
σ22
σ21
As Po →∞, we have,
CGCs → log2
σ22
σ21
Since log2(.) is a monotonically increasing function of its
argument, CGCs increases monotonically as SNR increases
and converges to log2 σ22/σ21 . Thus the behavior of the secret
capacity when finite constellation is used, is different from
what happens when the Gaussian codebook is used. This is a
very crucial point, which we feel is important and is missing
in the CGCs plot, to consider when constructing practical codes
for the Gaussian WTC.
III. CC-SC PLOTS FOR SOME KNOWN CONSTELLATIONS
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Plots for BPSK
CC−SC for NV−EC = 10
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CC−SC − Constellation Constrained Secrecy Capacity
GC−SC − Gaussian Codebook Secrecy Capacity
CC−SC for NV−EC = 5
GC−SC for NV−EC=20
GC−SC for NV−EC=15
GC−SC for NV−EC=10
GC−SC for NV−EC=5
Fig. 2. CC Capacity curves when BPSK is used and for varying noise
variances of the eavesdropper’s channel. Curves are plotted for noise variances
of 5, 10, 15 and 20
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Plots for 4−QAM
CC−SC for NV−EC = 5
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Fig. 3. CC Capacity curves when 4-QAM is used and for varying noise
variances of the eavesdropper’s channel. Curves are plotted for noise variances
of 5, 10, 15 and 20.
All the figures in this section are plotted by fixing the noise
variance of the main channel to 1 and increasing the average
power of the constellation used continuously, to vary the
SNR. Since the assumption is that the eavesdropper’s channel
must be more noisy compared to the main channel, σ22 is > 1
in all the figures. In each of Fig.2, Fig.3, Fig.4 and Fig.5 we fix
h(Y ) = −
∫
y
p(y) log2 p(y) dy
= log2M + log2 pi −
1
M
i=M−1∑
i=0
EN1

log2

j=M−1∑
j=0
exp−
(
|N1 +
√
SNR
(
xi − xj) |2)




I(X ;Y ) = h(Y )− log2 pie
= log2
(
M
e
)
− 1
M
i=M−1∑
i=0
EN1

log2

j=M−1∑
j=0
exp−
(
|N1 +
√
SNR
(
xi − xj) |2)



 (12)
h(Z) = −
∫
z
p(z) log2 p(z) dz
= log2M + log2 piσ
2 − 1
M
i=M−1∑
i=0
EN2

log2

j=M−1∑
j=0
exp−
(
|N2 +
√
SNR
(
xi − xj) |2
σ2
)


I(X ;Z) = h(Z)− log2 pieσ22
= log2
(
M
e
)
− 1
M
i=M−1∑
i=0
EN2

log2

j=M−1∑
j=0
exp−
(
|N2 +
√
SNR
(
xi − xj) |2
σ2
)


 (13)
Cccs = I(X ;Y )− I(X ;Z)
=
1
M
i=M−1∑
i=0
EN2

log2

j=M−1∑
j=0
exp−
(
|N2 +
√
SNR
(
xi − xj) |2
σ2
)



− EN1
[
log2
(
k=M−1∑
k=0
exp−
(
|N1 +
√
SNR
(
xi − xk) |2)
)]
(14)
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Plots for 8−PSK
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Fig. 4. CC Capacity curves when 8-PSK is used and for varying noise
variances of the eavesdropper’s channel. Curves are plotted for noise variances
of 5, 10, 15 and 20.
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Plots for 16−QAM
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Fig. 5. CC Capacity curves when 16-QAM is used and for varying noise
variances of the eavesdropper’s channel. Curves are plotted for noise variances
of 5, 10, 15 and 20.
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Fig. 12. Combined 3D-plot showing the CC-SC curves for BPSK, 4-QAM, 8-PSK, 16-QAM.
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Fig. 6. CC capacity plot of main channel and that of eavesdropper’s channel
for different σ2
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when BPSK is used.
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Fig. 7. CC capacity plot of main channel and that of eavesdropper’s channel
for different σ2
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when 4-QAM constellation is used.
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Fig. 8. CC capacity plot of main channel and that of eavesdropper’s channel
for different σ2
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when 8-PSK constellation is used.
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Fig. 9. CC capacity plot of main channel and that of eavesdropper’s channel
for different σ2
2
when 16-QAM constellation is used.
the constellation and plot the curves by varying σ22 . Observe
that the CC-SC curves for different constellations shows up a
maximum for some finite SNR and monotonically decreases
thereafter, before converging to zero at infinity. Also observe
the behavior of the secrecy capacity curves with Gaussian
codebook which continuously increases as the SNR increases
and converges to log2
σ2
2
σ2
1
at infinity.
Fig.6, Fig.7, Fig.8 and Fig.9 are the plots showing the
individual CC channel capacities of the main channel and
the eavesdropper’s channel for various σ22 . From (3) we
know that the CC-SC is the difference between individual
CC capacities of the main channel and the eavesdropper’s
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Fig. 10. Max CC Secrecy rate curves showing the maximum secrecy rate
achieved as a function of the noise variance of the eavesdropper’s channel.
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Fig. 11. SNR curves showing the SNR at which the maximum in the
CC secrecy capacity is achieved as a function of the noise variance of the
eavesdropper’s channel.
channel. Observe that CC capacity curves of the main channel
and eavesdropper’s channel start at 0 and converge at infinity.
As σ22 increases the CC capacity curve of the eavesdropper’s
channel rises more and more slowly and eventually converge
to log2M . It can also be observed that the gap between the
CC capacities of the main channel and eavesdropper’s channel,
which is also the CC-SC, increases slowly, maximizes at some
point and decreases thereafter. Based on this observation, we
conjecture that the CC-SC curves for various constellations
have a single maximum. Gaussian codebook secrecy capacity
plots show that not much is gained by increasing the power,
but in fact from the CC-SC plots we show that, just by
increasing the power, for any fixed constellation, Cccs , which
is the maximum achievable secrecy rate, takes a hit as SNR
increases beyond the point of maximum.
Fig.(10) is a plot showing the maximum achievable secrecy
rate (Rate corresponding to the SNR at which the maximum
occurs), for different constellations, by varying σ22 . As it can be
seen from the plots, maximum achievable rate monotonically
increases and converges to the SISO Gaussian capacity, as σ22
tends to infinity, at infinity. This is because as σ22 tends to ∞,
the WTC looks more like a SISO Gaussian channel and the
maximum rate achievable in the SISO case is infinity.
Fig.(11) is a plot showing the SNR at which the maximum
occurs for different constellations, by varying σ22 . As can be
seen from the plots since the SNR at which the maximum
occurs remains constant for large deviation in σ22 , exactly
knowing σ22 to operate at maximum is mitigated. But it is also
true that the SNR at which the maximum occurs increases
continuously and tends to infinity as the noise variance tends
to infinity. This is due to the fact that, as the noise variance
tends to infinity, the WTC looks more like a SISO Gaussian
channel with maximum rate occurring at SNR =∞.
Fig.(12) is a combined 3-D CC-SC plots for BPSK, 4-
QAM, 8-PSK, 16-QAM, plotted by varying the SNR at the
legitimate receiver and by varying σ22 . This plot combines the
effect of changing SNR as well as changing σ22 on the CC-SC.
As can be seen from the plots, though the Gaussian codebook
secrecy capacity plot continuously increases for increasing
SNR and increasing σ22 , the CC-SC for all the constellations
shows that as σ22 increases, SNR must be increased at a
controlled rate, to be operating at the maximum. Either fixing
the SNR to one particular value or an uncontrolled change
with respect to σ22 makes CC-SC to decrease continuously
IV. CONCLUSION
We have shown that the CC-SC curve for a Gaussian WTC
plotted against the SNR of the main channel, for a fixed
noise variance of the eavesdropper’s channel has a global
maximum. We also conjectured from the plots that the curves
may have a single maximum. This result shows that when
designing practical codes for a Gaussian WTC, for any chosen
constellation, increasing the power beyond the maximum point
is harmful as the secrecy capacity curve dips continuously
thereafter. This also shows that, when designing a coding
scheme, using some finite complex constellation, constrained
by power Po, the SNR corresponding to Po if is greater than
the SNRmax, it makes sense to reduce the power and operate
at SNRmax. Thus we feel the result is very important more
so because the capacity plots with Gaussian codebook fails to
provide this information. The plots, we feel, might also be used
to compare the performances of some of the existing coding
schemes like the one based on LDPC in [11]. In the case
of LDPC based code construction given in [11], information
about the maximum possible reduction in the security gap can
be obtained. Thus our result can be a guideline for practical
code constructions.
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